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ABSTRACT

A new approach, to Shuttle Launch, Team
Training is required. This change is
driven by two major factors; i.e.,
adjustment of training philosophy
from a short term RVD effort to a
long term program, and a considera
tion for the transfer of knowledge
from long term professionals to
neophytes entering the program. To be
oost effective, it is necessary for
this approach to build upon and en
hance presently utilized training
techniques.
Three different com
panies have been contracted to study
the Shuttle Processing Contractor's
(SPC) current training methodology
and equipment, and then subsequently
recommend changes and new approaches
for the Launch Team Training System
of the future.
The Launch Team
Training System (LTTS), as presently
envisioned, will combine management
action, hardware, software and com
munications networking into a struc
tural system which will be utilized
to train, certify, recertify and
maintain the proficiency of the KSC
Launch Team, both individually ft™** in
groups.
INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of the SPC KSC
NASA/Contractor Team is to assemble
and verify the proper functions of
hardware/software systems and to
safely launch the integrated package
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into orbit.
In order to accomplish
this primary mission, both NASA and
contractor personnel are required to
be highly skilled and very competent
in all the individual tasks that each
are required to accomplish.
This
paper provides an overview of the
training techniques that the KSC
NASA/Contractors have used in the
past, what they are doing today, and
where they must go in the future to
ensure successful accomplishment of
the primary mission: "to test and
launch Shuttles and their Payloads
into orbit".
PAST

We need to examine how and why we did
things in the past to better under
stand how and where we should go in
the future.
This holds true for
designing both training and hardware
systems - Form Follows Functions -.
Historically, here at KSC, contrac
tors have been faced with relatively
short duration programs:
Mercury
lasted 3 years, Gemini lasted almost
2 years, and Apollo lasted nearly 6
years.
Training and information
knowledge was usually gained by in
dividual involvement in the Vehicle
or GSE design, development of check
out procedures and on-the-job train
ing.
The work force, once trained,
generally stayed with the program.
During these short programs, person
nel attrition and the requisite

training required, was not a con
sideration of any great magnitude.
Vhen an existing program had a change
of prime contractors, a good portion
of the incumbent work force was
employed by the winning contractor,
which effectively transferred their
experience. The glue that held it
all together and provided continuity
was the NASA work force. However, at
the conclusion of Apollo Soyez the
contractor work force was scattered
and NASA personnel were diverted into
different areas.
The beginning of the Shuttle prograa
saw the gathering of the remnants of
the various contractor Apollo Test
Teams.
NASA provided much of the
technical expertise, while the con
tractor teams learned from NASA's ex
perience base.
During the start-up
phase, training of personnel took the
classical KSC approach - learn by
doing.
Thus during the first few
flights.
the Test Team developed
its expertise by working together,
learning from Its mistakes and
troubleshooting the many component
failures always present in a new
state of the art prograa. A total
Test Team dress rehearsal for Launch
was accomplished utilizing the flight
hardware during a Terminal Countdown
Demonstration.
Limited malfunctions
were induced during this test to ex
ercise the Test Team. Because of
Vehicle configuration, the type and
fidelity of the malfunctions were
heavily restricted.
Training of the Test and Launch Team
during these first 11 flights was ac
complished by a combination of formal
classroom courses taught by profes
sional Instructors or taught by en
gineers proficient In the required
skill or system, and on-the-job
training (OJT) as determined by su
pervision. Emphasis was placed on
OJT to hone the skill level of the
Individual. Actual testing of the
flight hardware maintained that skill
level.

For the first time in KSC processing
history, issuance of the
Shuttle
Processing Contract (SPC) presented a
contractor organization with a long
duration program (possibly 15 years;
that would require planned replace
ment and training of its work force.
In addition, the processing rate
required by the projected manifest
precluded the ability to learn by
doing. There was also a shifted em
phasis to a Load 4f Launch philosophy.
As the program matured, component
failures were reduced, so the oppor
tunity to train by troubleshooting
actual hardware failures declined
considerably.
Figure 1 shows that processing time
has declined as the program matured.
Hote that In most oases.
long
processing time Is associated with
first flow vehicles.

The SPC Is responsible for all KSC
related activities involving the
Shuttle In the National Spaoe
Transportation System. A major con
tractual obligation Is to have in
place a skilled, motivated, trained,
proficient and certified Launch Team,
capable of the safe and efficient
checkout and launch of the Space
Shuttle. To meet this obligation,
all employees Involved in the
processing
activities
must be
trained, tested, certified and peri
odically recertified to ensure that
operations and hardware testing are
performed in compliance with accept
able standard practices. Determina
tion of the best way to accomplish
this task while still processing
Shuttles is a major goal which has
yet to be accomplished.
An analysis of prograa training needs
Indicates that required Test Team
knowledge oan be classified into
three broad areas: policies V prooe-
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dures,
skills,
and technical
knowledge
of
Shuttle
systems.
Policies V procedures apply to all
the processing work force, skills
apply mostly to the Technician and
Quality Assurance personnel, and
Shuttle systems expertise applies
mainly to the Process Engineering
(console operators) work force.
The core of experienced personnel,
both NASA and contractors, is aging.
Many of the experienced people have
moved into management positions and
out of the hands-on work force. Many
inexperienced engineering personnel
have entered the work force (today
approximately 25% of the Process En
gineers have less than one year ex
perience in Shuttle checkout). The
time to adequately train and certify
engineering personnel can vary from
12 to 18 months.
Considering these
facts, it became apparent that Im
proved methods of training and ex
perience transfer were necessary.
The question of how to .transfer the
operational knowledge from the exist
ing experts to the new kids on the
block had to be answered.
The SPC Instituted a two pronged ap
proach to solve the training problem.
The first thrust was short range to
take care of immediate training
requirements by the expansion of the
current training methods, improvement
of existing simulation capability,
and the scheduling of training exer
cises with the same priority as
hardware tests. The second thrust
was the study of the whole SPC TrainIng program, and the development of
user requirements which would take
advantage of state of the art tools
and techniques used by others outside
the KSC environment.
To accomplish the short range goal,
the SPC undertook the task of iden
tifying and formally documenting
training requirements for all person
nel requiring certification. This
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task has generally been accomplished;
however, fine tuning and standard
ization of requirements is still un
derway. In addition, a team of En
gineers and Operations personnel was
tasked to expand and 'enhance the
simulation capability using the
hardware and software Inherited by
the SPC. The fidelity of math models
developed to support application
program validation for the 27 major
Shuttle systems were modified from
low fidelity (capable of local rampIng of analog processes) to high
fidelity (which actually reflects
hardware activity and effects result
ing from any stimulus, normal or
abnormal). Further enhancements in
cluded interoommunioatlon between
system models which were once stand
alone. Integration of system models
necessary to support a typical Launch
scenario have been developed and
implemented.
This
Integration
requirement gave rise to radical
changes in existing models in order
to streamline execution times and
reduce the total computer execution
requirements.
These changes were
necessary to minimize the actual lag
from real time under heavy execution
periods and to allow for large
master models to be utilized. An ad
ditional need for the model to
recycle to nominal pre-oonflgurations
upon a user's request was also iden
tified and partially accomplished.
The Countdown can now be recycled to
a T-20 Minute configuration.
To give some idea of the size of the
current simulation, there are 94, 500
model statements and 86,700 model
control procedure statements that
have been developed, debugged and
implemented.
Currently, the Launch Team is par
ticipating monthly in three Launch
Countdown Simulations (from 20 min
utes prior to Launch) with Inserted
malfunctions. Since the initiation of
these exercises in Feb. of 1987, the
models have been improved such that

the lag in execution from real time
has gone from formerly as muoh as 30
seconds behind to now only 2 or 3
seconds behind at T-0.
Although the present simulation
capability is considered highly
successful, it became apparent that
additional enhancements to the
simulation capability are severely
limited by the existing hardware and
software, as evidenced by:
a. Excessive time required to design
and build Model Control Procedures
(MCP) so they can be executed in the
allotted d£ execution space.
b.
Excessive time spent optimizing
model execution efficiency to maxi
mize usage of the limited Central
Data System (CDS) resource.
o. Excessive time utilized minimiz
ing model table space usage to con
serve the CDS resource.
d.
Lack of computer speed to simu
late wave functions, sample rates
real time outputs and solutions to
systems of partial differential equa
tions.
e. Lack of ability to effectively
simulate meters/talkbaoks. switch and
circuit breaker positions, failed
cells and model variables for both
flight h&rdware systems and GSE.
f.
Excessive time required to ini
tialize the simulation system. It
presently takes four hours to set up
and initialize the models.
g. Inability to stop the simulation,
rapidly reset the models b&ck to some
predetermined point, or Jump ahead to
some predetermined point.
The second, or longer range, part of
solving the training problem was the
initiation of an Internal study
program in the Pall of I960 and com
pleted in August 1966 to answer the

question:
"How to best train
personnel"? The study was limited
to: the training requirements of the
Process Engineers, (who man the con
soles and make up the majority of the
Launch Team) and the Managers and
Test Directors (who must support
decision making and crisis support).
This limitation was Imposed because
the SPC had in place a very success
ful program to train and certify the
technician work force. The system
that evolved from the study of train
ing for Pirlng Room personnel came to
be called the Launch Team Training
System (LTTS).
The .Launch Team Training System con
cept is not new.
Airlines, the
Department of Defense aM the Nuclear
Power Plant industry have been using
simulator concepts in the training of
their employees for a number of
years.
NASA has used simulator
training in its astronaut program
since the Mercury program.
What is
different from past simulation con
cepts is the number of people in
volved in training at one time, the
number of parameters addressed, and
the fidelity of the math models used.
The Study Team oonoentrated on
identifying:
the individuals and
groups of people to be trained, the
training requirements of each person
or group identified, ^* the means to
accomplish the training identified.
"PD KK

The following is an Illustration of
the scope of the training problem by
shoving a typical Launch Day Firing
Room manning schema.
There are 60 certified positions
identified that make up the Firing
Room Test and Launch Team.
Figure 2 Illustrates personnel who
control the Launch Countdown in the
Prime Firing Room. There are ap
proximately 170 Console Operator
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Specialists in the front part of the
Firing Room, 74 Computer Specialists
in the back part of the Firing Room
and 30 Test Management personnel in
the upper part of the Firing Room.
Figure 3 illustrates the layout of
the Engineering Support Areas used to
support
the
Console
Operator
Specialists (Engineers) in the Prime
Firing Room. There are approximately
211 highly experienced Systems
Specialists and Managers located in
these areas, comprised of repre
sentatives from the SPC, Rockwell,
Martin, USBI, Rooketdyne, Morton
Thiokol, MoDonnell Douglas and all
their respective NASA counterparts.
The Complex Control Center, shown in
Figure 4, is manned by 60 specialists
in institutional systems such as
facility power, air conditioning,
pneumatics, water, etc.
As you can imagine, with this diverse
set of personnel,
the training
requirements are diverse as well.
The study indicated the following
groups must be accommodated:
TEST MANAGERS - Contractor and NASA
Test Conductors, Test Directors,
Launch Directors, and Safety Direc
tors.
TEST CONSOLE OPERATORS - Contractor
and NASA Flight Hardware and GSE
Process System Engineers representing
27 different technical disciplines.
COMPUTER OPERATORS - Computer operat
ing and maintenance personnel.
FACILITY TEST

SUPPORT OPERATORS

-

Contractor and NASA Facility 9 Sup
port personnel representing 7 dis
ciplines .

ENGINEERING SUPPORT PERSONNEL - Con
tractor and NASA specialists, includ
ing LSS and Payload. Decision making
Managers who assist in troubleshoot
ing and problem resolution.
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The combined total of these groups
comprises a combination of ap
proximately 1,000 contractor and NASA
personnel.
TRAINING

The study indicated that the training
methodology should be based on a
building block arrangement. Figure 5
indicates the progression path a new
Engineer should follow leading to
certification and the maintenance of
certification.
MiFAPfi

The existing simulation capability
described earlier involves large num
bers of personnel.
The building
block approach described above dic
tates that a single system and
cluster simulation capability be
developed to enable more intensive
and focused training for an in
dividual. Findings indicate the ex
isting Countdown simulation time
period should be extended to cover
all 73 hours of a Countdown, and the
model fidelity should be increased to
the point where the console operator
will not notice any significant dif
ference between the modeled and real
hardware .
The existing training system today
provides qualified and certified per
sonnel, the question is, H Can the mix
of training media and emphasis be
rearranged to make it more efficient
and effective"?
FUTURE

KSC NASA and SPC management issued a
Request For Proposals (RFP) to com
panies with expertise in the training
and simulation fields to conduct a
six month study of the NASA/ SPC
training process and equipment. The
objectives of the study are to:

Make maximum use cf existing
1.
methods, in-place systems, hardware
and software as possible, but recom
mend whatever changes, innovations,
or new equipment will be required to
aooompllsh the overriding goal of
providing quality training to the
Test Team.
Recommend the proper mix of
2.
training methodologies to shorten
training time of new personnel
without sacrificing quality.
Provide the ability to maintain
3.
and Improve the skill level of the
existing Test tf Launch Team.
4. Reduce training time using flight
hardware.
5. Hake provisions to allow the Team
to experience and solve hardware mal
functions before encountering the
real thing.
Provide the means to observe,
6.
manage and certify Teams and In
dividuals, and maintain useful per
formance histories.
7. Recommend the means to Introduce
new training techniques and proce
dures without using flight hardware.
6. Recommend ways to overcome the
existing limitations Imposed on the
simulation exercises by existing
equipment and software.
9.

Avoid negative training.

The SPC vision of the LTTS of the fu
ture would Include standardized
training requirements for all console
By that, I don't mean
operations.
everyone should spend the same exact
hours training or take exactly the
but should meet
same courses.
measured milestones of knowledge and
skill levels required by their par
ticular function. Management has an
obligation to provide the proper
tools to enable the trainee to
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progress toward his g^als in the most
and become a
efficient manner.
productive member of the Team. Some
of the "tools" might be workstations
easily available to the uiaployee in
his own work area, where he can
pursue self paced. Interactive study
programs of increasing complexity to
AS the student
learn his system.
progresses tu*<* becomes more familiar
with his system, he could train and
practice using his actual console,
interacting with highly realistic
He would receive Immediate
models.
feedback on his performance from the
Els training
program or a trainer.
time and performance would automati
cally be recorded and made available
to the student and the trainer for
critique and analysis. Ideally, this
part of the training process should
be fun. Engineers should be standing
In line to use these workstations and
consoles.
The simulation system of this future
LTTS would be so flexible that
changes to the actual hardware and
software could be duplicated rapidly
In tho model programs to avoid nega
The computer system
tive training.
would have a largo enough mass
storage and speed of operation to
overcome the limitations of existing
equipment. Some of the improvements
envisioned ore:
The rapid initialization, (within 10
minutes) of the total LPS/Simulation
system. This would realize a saving
of nearly the entire four hours it
currently takes to do this job.
The ability to hold the Countdown at
any point then proceed, reset, or
backup to some predetermined point.
It currently takes nearly 49 minutes
to recycle back to a T-20 minute con
figuration. Thera ia no existing
capability to rapidly reset to a
predetermined point other than T-9
minutes or T-20 minutes.

A feedback system to enable the
simulation control engineers to
monitor the execution of the models.
A menu driven malfunction selection
capability to enable insertion of
malfunctions in real time.
The automatic tracking of individual
or teams training time and progress.
Today training time and progress are
tracked manually.
The ability to rapidly simulate
manual operations such as cockpit
switch positioning* hardwire safelng
panels,
or GSE valve actions to
simulate responses to troubleshooting
directions from System Engineers.
The ability to simulate (or utilize
ground test hardware in place of
models) for the Shuttle onboard
general purpose computers, main en
gines computers and main engines.
The ability to accommodate processing
cycle transactions of less than 40
milliseconds with deviations from
realtlme of less than .29 seconds
over less than 1 second durations.
Faster processing and increased
capacity of the simulation computer
to handle model sizes of ap
proximately 900,000, 32 bit words,
which would allow the additional
capability to simulate major electri
cal bus failures, KDH bite test
failures and realistic I/O errors
presently not practicable.
The capability to accommodate several
different single system simulations
simultaneously as well as performance
of cluster simulations in parallel
with single system training.
In summary, refer to Table 1 for the
plan to achieve the LTTS objectives.
The development of malfunction
scenarios and the analysis required
to understand and establish the cor
rect response to the malfunction is
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the first step in gathering the
necessary knowledge to create expert
systems. In the process of gathering
this knowledge, we will have begun to
accomplish one of the LTTS goals of
knowledge transfer from the ex
perienced "old hand" to the new
"green" Engineer.
The three LTTS Study Contracts will
be completed in June 1986. An SPC
Team will evaluate the recommenda
tions, consolidate requirements, and
issue an RFP for implementation of
the enhanced LTTS.
We believe the implementation of the
LTTS will enable the NASA/SPC to sus
tain the skill depth of the ex
perienced Launch Team as well as
train and develop new Launch Team
members.
It will give us a very
realistic tool to develop new tech
niques and procedures prior to use on
the flight hardware.
The LTTS will
be able to expose an engineer to
failures and allow him to train for
correct responses, thus reducing the
potential for human error on flight
hardware. If, as a result of realis
tic simulations, we can save one 24
hour scrub turnaround, we will have
saved the program approximately
$1,000,000. Most importantly it will
begin the process of transferring the
corporate knowledge and expertise of
todays Launch Team to tomorrows
Launch Team trainee.
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LTTS
BUILDING BLOCK APPROACH
POLICY AND PROCEDURE FAMILIARIZATION
•
•

•

FORMAL COURSES

WALKDOWNS

START OF TRAINING PLAN

SYSTEM FAMILIARIZATION
•
•
•
•

FORMAL COURSES
MANUALS
SCHEMATICS
SYSTEMS WALKDOWNS

COMPUTER AIDED TRAINING
• SELF PACED
• TIMED
• OJT WITH EXPERIENCED ENGR
(Usually Observation)

SINGLE SYSTEM SIMULATIONS (LPS)
.
.
•
•
•

el

II

NORMAL PROCEDURE OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE OPERATIONS W/MALFUNCTIONS
PERFORMANCE DEMO TO SUPERVISOR
SYSTEM SPECIALIST
OJT WITH EXPERIENCED ENGR.
(Usually Operating)
FIRST LEVEL OF CERTIFICATION

V
CLUSTER SIMULATIONS (LPS)
•
•
•

NORMAL PROCEDURE OPERATIONS
PROCEDURE OPERATIONS W/MALFUNCTIONS
SECOND LEVEL OF CERTIFICATION

INTEGRATED SIMULATIONS (LPS)
• LAUNCH TEAM OPERATIONS W/ MALFUNCTIONS
• LAUNCH TEAM CERTIFICATION

Figure 5
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LTTS OBJECTIVES
REQUIREMENT

Determine user groups

Provide means to shorten
training of new personnel
without sacrificing
qua I Ity.

CD

LA664

SOLUTION
Test Managers
Test Console Operators
Computer Operators
Facility Ttest Support Operators
a. Utilize existing formal courses.
b. Establish computer aided programs - self directed
and se I f paced .
c. Expand existing simulation programs into Hi-fidely
single system, cluster, and fully integrated
programs .
d. Formalize and standardize the OJT training plans,
e. Certify personnel! after sucessfully participating
in simulations and taking an oral exam.

Provide means to maintain
and improve the skill
level of the existing
team members .

After certification - specify a minimum number of
simulation exercises that must be completed in a
given time period.
Develop creditable failures to be inserted into
the simulations and practice trouble shooting
techniques and proper responses to emergencies.

Provide a means to intro
duce new techniques and
procedures without using
flight h a r dwa r e.

Increase the f ideI i ty of model programs so that
there is vi r tua I Iy no difference between the model
and the hardware.

Reduce training time using
flight h a r dwa r e .

By providing Hi-fidelity models and using real LPS
consoles, the trainee will have experienced
essentially the same operating environment as he
would using actual hardware.
Therefor, reruns or
repeats of tests on real hardware caused by human
error should be reduced.

Table 1

LTTS OBJECTIVES
SOLUTION

REQUIREMENT

a. This action will be accomplished if we properly
Provide a means to allow
answer 3, 4 and 5 above.
the team to experience and
solve hardware failures
before encountering the
reaI th i ng.
Provide a means to
observe, manage and
certify teams and indivi
duals while maintaining
useful performance
h i story.

Each individual will be assigned a number and a
planned training schedule. Unique number will be
used to automatically track time spent on computer
aided training and simulations. The student pro
gresses through each milestone until he is
certified. His training records will be kept and
tracked for currency in the existing Training and
Certification Record System (TCRS).

Make maximum use of exist a. Existing formal policy courses and systems courses
taught by professional Instructures will continue
ing hardware/software and
to be used.
trai n i ng.
b. The existing TCRS System will be utilized.
c. The CCMS IPS hardware and the existing applica
tions software will be retained.
d. Three contractors are currently studying the
proper mis of existing training methods as well
as existing hardware and operating software. The
study is to be completed by June, 1988.

CO
CD

ro

Avoid negative training.
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The operator will not know the difference between
his real system and the model is the proper model
control procedures are used and the fidelity of
the model approaches the real hardware.

Tobl* 1 (cont.)

